New Article in Applied Clinical Trials

Designing Incentives for CRO Selection: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Pharma Partnerships

Our article in Applied Clinical Trials discusses the critical importance of rethinking vendor selection in Phase II/III trials for rare and genetic diseases, positing that misaligned incentives (and trust) rather than a lack of capability or intent to form a collaborative relationship are the primary drivers of project underperformance.

In it, Christoph Pfeiffer and I introduce a game-theoretic framework that shifts the focus from traditional vendor evaluation to incentive design, proposing a four-layer strategy that includes science-first qualification, ecosystem formation, mechanism-designed procurement, and outcome-aligned contracting.

By leveraging mechanism design principles, we argue that sponsors (and CRO partners) can create selection (and matching) processes that promote truthful disclosure and collaboration among stakeholders, thereby fostering genuine partnerships and enhancing the likelihood of success in complex clinical trials.